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Abstract 
Negotiating a synergized solution is challenging under optimal circumstances. Add in the 
challenge of cross-cultural differences, cultural collision occurs leading to worse negotiation 
outcomes in intercultural negotiation than intracultural ones (e.g., Adair et al., 2001; Adair et al., 
2007). Given that intercultural negotiations are both challenging and prevalent, this study 
investigates how to improve intercultural negotiation effectiveness, and demonstrates when 
intercultural negotiators can in fact achieve significantly better outcomes than intracultural 
negotiators (i.e. cultural synergy). Drawing insights from research on cultural essentialism and 
its influence on intergroup relations and conflicts, I examine the interaction between essentialist 
beliefs and the cultural context in negotiation. Using an actor-partner interdependence model, I 
reveal that whether cultures collide or synergize in intercultural negotiation depends on 
negotiators’ endorsement of cultural essentialist beliefs. Intercultural negotiators who believed 
that cultural characteristics are malleable (i.e. non-essentialist beliefs) achieved higher individual 
gains and joint gains, compared to not only intercultural negotiators who endorsed stronger 
essentialist beliefs, but also intracultural negotiators. Beyond identifying why cultures collide in 
negotiation, these findings pave the way for future research to examine factors that help 
negotiators harvest cultural synergy for favorable negotiation outcomes. 
Keywords: Culture, Multicultural Experience, Intercultural Negotiation, Essentialism 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 2010, it has been estimated that over 215 million people lived in a country other than 
their place of birth (Migration Policy Institute, 2010). In the same year, trade in and with 
developing countries, including South Africa, India, and other Asian countries, contributed to 
almost 50% of world gross domestic product, compared to only 25% in 1980 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2012). Global labor mobility and the rise of multinational corporations has also 
brought workforce diversity across nations in the past 50 years and the trend is expected to 
continue (Hays-Thomas, 2004). Under the surging demand of international trade and the trend of 
global business collaborations, growing numbers of business transactions and negotiations are 
made both across and within borders with people of different cultures and ethnicities. 
 In our current globalized and multicultural society, negotiating with foreign friends, 
colleagues, and business partners, both within and across borders are essential to social and 
economic prosperity. However, negotiating a creative and synergized solution is challenging 
enough provided with optimal circumstances; add in the challenge of cross-cultural differences, 
cultural collision occurs, leading to worse negotiation outcomes in intercultural negotiation than 
intracultural ones (see Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Adair, 2003; Adair et al., 2004; Brett et 
al., 1998; Brett & Okumura, 1998). Supporting this notion, past cross-cultural negotiation 
research has consistently revealed that intercultural negotiators often face difficulties because of 
cultural differences, for example, in values, beliefs, negotiation styles and schemas (see Adair, 
Taylor, & Tinsley, 2009; Adair et al., 2004; Adair et al., 2001; Brett & Okumura, 1998). For 
example, East Asian negotiators value indirectness and communicate by exchanging offers, 
whereas Caucasian negotiators tend to directly ask for information. Therefore, intercultural 
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negotiators may give up early and close the deal before exploring all possible solutions, and are 
more likely to attain unsatisfying outcomes than intracultural ones (e.g. Adair et al., 2007).  
 Given that intercultural negotiations are both challenging and prevalent, improving the 
quality of these negotiations is critical. Negotiation and culture scholars are thus eagerly moving 
forward to provide practical insights to aid intercultural effectiveness. However, the extant 
literature in this regard is limited in its ability to address this issue. First, since most cross-
cultural negotiation research was conducted with intracultural observations across cultures, 
intercultural findings are scarce and many effects of the situation or individual factors remain 
unexamined (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007; Kray, 2005). Second, both 
theoretical and practical understanding of intercultural negotiation are underdeveloped because 
we cannot simply extrapolate the behaviours of negotiators within an intracultural context to an 
intercultural context (see Drake, 2001). Third, most research to date has focused on describing 
challenges associated with intercultural negotiations without examining whether or not they 
might present unique opportunities that intracultural negotiations do not offer (Adler, 1991; Liu, 
Chua, & Stahl, 2010; Weiss, 1994a, 1994b). 
As such, the current study extends past research by going beyond identifying why 
cultures collide, to explore the opportunity to harvest cultural synergy from intercultural 
negotiations. The study integrates past research on negotiations with intergroup relations and 
cultural essentialism (also called lay theories of race or culture) (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 
2007; Medin & Ortony, 1989; No et al., 2008), which have revealed that intercultural exposure 
can potentially lead to culturally synergistic outcomes through inducing flexible thinking, 
including increased creativity and idea integrations, better problem-solving, to higher generalized 
trust (Cao, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2013; Leung, Chen, & Chiu, 2010; Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, 
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& Chiu, 2008; Leung & Chiu, 2008; Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012). Arguably, it should 
be possible for negotiators to benefit an induced flexible mindset during intercultural negotiation, 
and I predict that whether cultures collide or synergize in intercultural negotiation depends on 
negotiators’ endorsement of cultural essentialist beliefs.  
The current study has recruited a manager sample in a simulated negotiation 
manipulating the cultural composition of the negotiation dyad. The findings provide support to 
the prediction that, relative to intracultural negotiators, non-essentialist intercultural negotiators 
can indeed benefit cultural synergy (i.e. create and and claim more values on the bargain table), 
while essentialist negotiators suffer cultural collisions (i.e. create and claim less values on the 
bargain table). 
Cultural Essentialism 
 Individuals endorse, to differing degrees, beliefs that certain human attributes are fixed or 
malleable  (see Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These beliefs are implicit assumptions about the world 
that help individuals make sense of their surroundings (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Heider, 1985; 
Kelly, 1955; Rehder, 2007), which are also called lay theories or implicit theories (see Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). In this 
research, I focus on cultural essentialist beliefs, defined as beliefs that cultural characteristics of 
racial or ethnic groups are fixed and immutable. Some people tend to view individuals’ cultural 
traits as reflecting an underlying essence that is fixed and cannot be changed (essentialist 
beliefs), whereas others see the attributes as malleable (non-essentialist beliefs) (Chao, Hong, & 
Chiu, 2013; Hong, Chao, & No, 2009; No et al., 2008). As the definitions of essentialism and 
entity beliefs of cultures are often identical, the terminologies have been used interchangeably in 
the literature (see Chao & Kung, 2014; Hong et al., 2009). In view of the tradition to use 
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essentialism when referring to beliefs about racial essences in past intergroup literature, on which 
I draw most of the evidence, this paper will use essentialist beliefs to mean entity beliefs of 
culture and non-essentialist beliefs to mean incremental beliefs of culture. 
 Essentialist and non-essentialist beliefs are not orthogonal; instead they mark the opposite 
ends of a single continuum of essentialist beliefs. Hence, the more you think cultural 
characteristics are fixed, the less also you think cultural characteristics are malleable (see Hong, 
Chao, & No, 2009; Hong et al., 2004; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). Essentialist beliefs 
color individuals’ interpretation of the social situation, guiding actions and shaping social 
responses (Detert & Edmondson, 2011; Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001). They are usually domain-
specific and are attached to particular situated outcomes. For example, beliefs about the 
malleability of personality influence social judgments and attributions of actions (e.g. Chiu et al., 
1997; Dweck et al., 1995; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & 
Hong, 2001; Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999), while beliefs about the malleability of social 
categories and interpersonal abilities influence relationship outcomes (e.g., Finkel, Burnette, & 
Scissors, 2007; Hui, Bond, & Molden, 2012; Ruvolo & Rotondo, 1998).  
In an intercultural context, because individuals attend to observable differences of racial 
and ethnocultural groups, their theories about the malleability of cultural group attributes would 
thus be of particular relevance. Regardless of whether those observable differences are actually 
changeable or not in nature, such beliefs were found influential to our judgments and perceptions 
across socio-cultural contexts (Jayaratne et al., 2006a; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). For 
example, essentialist beliefs were very often shown to be associated with stronger stereotype 
endorsement and exclusionary reactions toward various outgroups (Bastian & Haslam, 2006b; 
Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011; Howell, Weikum, & Dyck, 2011; 
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Keller, 2005; Kung, Chao, & Cheng, 2012; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rangel & Keller, 2011; 
Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998; Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, 
& Tip, 2013) 
In the following sections, I will further discuss how such essentialist beliefs may 
influence the extent to which individuals harvest cultural synergy or suffer from cultural collision 
in intergroup and negotiation contexts. 
How Cultures Synergize and Collide 
 Intercultural contexts can paradoxically lead to both positive and negative outcomes. On 
one hand, intercultural situations provide diverse knowledge and ideas analogous to providing 
new tools in a toolkit (see DiMaggio, 1997; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000). 
When being exposed to different cultures, individuals can attain new tools and if they use them 
flexibly, it facilitates integrative thinking and problem-solving (Tadmor, Satterstrom, Jang, & 
Polzer, 2012). Therefore, cultural synergy may occur. For example, knowledge of different 
values and norms from a foreign culture can be a tool. Participants being exposed to a foreign 
culture showed more profound and integrative thinking in their opinions about social issues 
(Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009). Supporting this notion, recent research has revealed that 
multicultural experience can lead to diverse and complex ideas, and higher creativity (Leung & 
Chiu, 2010; Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor, & Galinsky, 2013; Tadmor, Galinsky, & 
Maddux, 2012; Tadmor, Hong, Chao, Wiruchnipawan, & Wang, 2012), and sometimes even 
more tangible outcomes such as greater job success and better negotiation outcomes (Maddux, 
Adam, & Galinsky, 2010; Maddux et al., 2013). Such increase in cognitive flexibility and 
problem-solving capacity was achieved by not only having cross-cultural members working in a 
dyad or team (Crotty & Brett, 2012; Tadmor et al., 2012), but also experimentally presenting 
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juxtaposed cultural elements in the lab (Leung & Chiu, 2010). Increased cognitive flexibility 
allows people to see issues from multiple perspectives and be less biased. It has been 
documented in multiple studies that participants being exposed to multicultural images were 
found to have reduced bias towards ethnic outgroups, as well as other minority groups, 
homosexuals for example (Tadmor, Hong, et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, individuals can also find cultural tools incompatible and mutually 
exclusive, resulting in elevated intercultural threat and exclusion (e.g. Chiu & Cheng, 2007); 
therefore, cultural collision may occur. Some researchers have suggested that being exposed to 
foreign cultures can be threatening and can evoke tendencies to revert to one’s own culturally 
normative thinking style (see Morris, Mok, & Mor, 2011). When multicultural elements are 
presented simultaneously, cultural differences are usually exaggerated (Chiu, Mallorie, Keh, & 
Law, 2009). Such highlighted salience of cultural differences activates a sense of incompatibility 
between ingroup versus outgroup, deteriorating intergroup cooperation (e.g., Schwartz, Struch, & 
Bilsky, 1990); worse still, leading to rejection and increased animosities between groups (e.g., 
Jayaratne et al., 2006). 
In light of evidence that cultures can collide or synergize in intercultural contact, the 
question of when either can happen is both theoretically and practically important to address. In 
the following, I propose that essentialism moderates the cultural collision and synergy effect, and 
moreover, influence intercultural negotiation outcomes. 
The Moderating Role of Essentialist Beliefs in Intercultural Negotiations 
 As discussed earlier, cultural essentialist beliefs are situated and particularly relevant in 
an intercultural context. Essentialist beliefs influence how people view intercultural interactions. 
Individuals endorsing high essentialist beliefs, which I will term “essentialists”, tend to have a 
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fixed mindset, which encourages them to see cultural differences as incompatible and conflicting 
(No et al., 2008; Plaks, Malahy, Sedlins, & Shoda, 2012); therefore, cultures may collide because 
essentialists suffer from internal and intergroup conflicts in intercultural exposure. Empirical 
evidence supports this claim. In one study, participants endorsing high essentialist beliefs showed 
heightened anxiety reflected in physiological responses when recalling intercultural experiences, 
but not when recalling other experiences not related to culture (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong, 
2007). Similarly, recent studies with different cultural samples have consistently shown that 
essentialist beliefs are associated with rigid and close-minded thinking, and stronger rejection 
intention toward outgroups, such as foreigners and immigrants (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2008; 
Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; Tadmor, Chao, Hong, & Polzer, 2013; Tsukamoto, Enright, 
& Karasawa, 2013).  
 In contrast with essentialist beliefs, individuals endorsing low essentialist beliefs, whom I 
term “non-essentialists”, have a more flexible mindset, which encourages them to see cultural 
differences as malleable and more compatible (No et al., 2008; Plaks et al., 2012); therefore, 
cultures may synergize because non-essentialists are more likely to integrate diverse ideas and be 
creative from intercultural exposure  (e.g., Chua, 2013; Tadmor et al., 2013). Empirical evidence 
has provided some preliminary support. For instance, in a laboratory study, both individuals who 
chronically endorse or were induced with non-essentialist beliefs demonstrated more flexible 
thinking and creative problem-solving compared to those endorsing  or being induced with 
essentialist beliefs (Chao et al., 2013; Tadmor et al., 2013). Likewise, a series of large scale field 
studies conducted in the Middle East have shown that Palestinians who endorsed non-essentialist 
beliefs had more positive attitudes toward approaching and communicating with an outgroup 
(e.g. Israeli), even though the intergroup conflicts were fierce (Halperin et al., 2011).  
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 Therefore, in the context of negotiation, I argue that essentialist beliefs are likely to 
interact with the cultural context and influence the extent to which individuals harvest cultural 
synergy and suffer from cultural collision in their negotiation outcomes. Negotiations often 
involve multiple issues and negotiators have different preferences across the issues. Even if some 
of their preferences are opposite, negotiators can expand the value of an agreement to maximize 
negotiation gains when they discover integrative potential underlying the conflict (see Bazerman 
& Neale, 1994; Brett, 2007; Thompson, 1991). Prior research shows that creative thinking 
facilitates the discovery of appropriate tradeoffs and other novel solutions to maximize joint 
gains without compromising one’s individual gains (Barry & Friedman, 1998; De Dreu, Koole, 
& Steinel, 2000; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Kurtzberg, 1998). As cultural essentialist beliefs 
are likely to influence people’s attitudes and mindsets in an intercultural context but not in an 
intracultural context, I expect that essentialism interacts with the cultural context of negotiation.  
Hypothesis 1: Negotiators’ essentialist beliefs interact with the cultural condition of 
negotiation, where essentialism predicts individual gains more in intercultural (vs. 
intracultural) negotiation. 
 Moreover, because essentialist beliefs are associated with a fixed mindset and rejection 
attitude in intercultural interactions (e.g., Jayaratne et al., 2006), essentialist negotiators are likely 
to be more closed-minded, less motivated to understand their negotiation partner, and therefore 
fail to discover integrative potential in intercultural negotiations. This fixed mindset in turn 
should lead them to claim less value in intercultural than intracultural negotiations.  
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals who endorse essentialist beliefs will generate low gain in 
intercultural (vs. intracultural) negotiation.  
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 In contrast, because non-essentialist beliefs are associated with a flexible mindset and 
positive attitude toward outgroups, non-essentialist negotiators are more likely to be engaged in 
understanding their negotiation partner, benefit from enhanced integrative thinking with 
intercultural exposure (e.g., Maddux et al., 2013; Tadmor et al., 2013), and therefore discover 
integrative potential in intercultural negotiations. This in turn should lead them to claim more 
value in intercultural than intracultural negotiations. 
Hypothesis 2b: An individual’s level of negotiation gain is higher in intercultural (vs. 
intracultural) negotiation when the individual endorses non-essentialist beliefs  
 This research makes several important theoretical and practical contributions to both the 
negotiation and essentialism literature. This study identifies an important individual factor that 
helps negotiators maximize the chances of reaching optimal agreements especially in 
intercultural negotiations. With intercultural dyadic samples in this study, the results provide 
insight into understanding face-to-face intercultural interactions and how to improve intercultural 
negotiation effectiveness in a globalized world (e.g., Imai & Gelfand, 2010; Kern, Lee, Aytug, & 
Brett, 2010; Liu et al., 2010). In addition, this research also expands our knowledge on 
essentialist beliefs. Essentialist beliefs have been found to influence diverse social psychological 
outcomes in interpersonal and intergroup contexts (e.g., Chao et al., 2007; Keller, 2005), 
however, until recently we knew little about their implications in organizations and business (e.g., 
Chua, 2013). The findings will draw the attention of both scholars and practitioners to 
understanding the role of essentialist beliefs in organizational settings, and demonstrate how 
unspoken assumptions could robustly lead to substantial differences in tangible monetary 
outcomes. Overall, the study fills the void of understanding about intercultural negotiation, and 
provides useful solutions to intercultural negotiation scholars and practitioners. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Method 
 To test whether essentialism moderates the effects of cultural context on negotiation 
outcomes, I manipulated the cultural condition (intra- vs. intercultural negotiation) in simulated 
2-party negotiations and measured negotiators’ essentialism, joint gains and individual gains.  
Participants 
 I recruited participants (N = 78) from two MBA classes in a Canadian university with a 
highly diverse population. The substantial ethnic diversity in these classes (1 African, 22 
Caucasians, 19 East Asians, 7 Middle Easterners, and 29 South-East Asians) allowed us to 
manipulate the cultural condition of negotiation: intra- vs intercultural negotiation. The average 
age was 28.3 years (SD = 4.8) and 68% were male. Participants received a movie ticket coupon 
as an appreciation of their participation in the research study. 
Negotiation Simulation 
 All participants negotiated a two-party face-to-face simulation called Cartoon (Dispute 
Resolution Research Center., 2008). The simulation was about the sale of rerun rights for a 
children’s television cartoon between the seller – a major film production company, and the 
buyer – a television station (see role materials in Appendix A and B). There was 1 distributive 
issue (price of the cartoon) and 2 tradeoff issues between the number of runs (how many times 
the cartoon can be broadcasted during the 5-year contract time) and financing (the schedule of 
the payment). While it is more crucial for the buyer to have a greater number of runs, it is more 
crucial for the seller to have the payment up front. It creates a logrolling opportunity. Negotiators 
could also include a common-value issue, a second television program, which creates values for 
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both parties. Last, negotiators could also draft a contingent contract to have the payment 
dependent on different rating expectations (see payoff table in Appendix C). This simulation was 
suitable for testing the hypotheses because it includes multiple issues that require a significant 
amount of information processing and communication exchanges. Furthermore, the scenario is 
commonly used in intercultural negotiation research and the content has been suggested to be 
suitable across cultures (Adair & Brett, 2005; Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gunia, Brett, 
Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Liu, Friedman, & Hong, 2012) 
Procedure 
 Cartoon was participants’ third in-class negotiation exercise. Role materials and role 
assignments were distributed one week before the negotiation. Participants also filled out a pre-
negotiation survey immediately before the exercise started. Negotiating time was controlled to be 
within 75 minutes. After the negotiation participants individually filled out a post-negotiation 
survey, and this was followed by a debrief of the exercise and study. 
Cultural Condition Manipulation 
 All participants filled out a demographics survey during the first week of class. 
Information about ethnicity, gender, country of birth and self-report English ability was collected. 
Participants were randomly pre-assigned to negotiate with a same-gender partner, either in the 
intracultural (same ethnicity and country of birth; N = 32, 68% male), or intercultural condition 
(different ethnicity and country of birth; N = 44, 68% male)1. The self-report levels of English 
ability of English-as-second-language learners were compared between the conditions to ensure 
                                                             
1 3 dyads were dropped in the analysis. One negotiator in 1 dyad did not fill out the surveys. Two dyads were mixed-
gender because two negotiators were absent and they formed dyads on the spot. The numbers presented in the 
brackets are the resulting number of participants in each condition in our analysis. 
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differences in negotiation outcomes were not due to language ability, and there was no 
significant difference, p > .05. 
 Given the diversity of the background of the participants, I assessed whether the 
participants differed in their perceived cultural differences from their negotiation partner across 
the two conditions. Two items about cultural distance were included in the post-negotiation 
survey (“I feel that my negotiation partner in Cartoon is from a very different ethnic culture 
compared to where I am from” and “the ethnic culture of my negotiation partner in Cartoon is 
very exotic to me”; from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The manipulation check 
confirmed that participants indeed felt more culturally distant from their partners in the 
intercultural condition (M = 3.28, SD = .99), than in the intracultural condition (M = 1.59, SD 
= .79), t(72) = 7.88, p < .001. 
Cultural Essentialism 
 Cultural essentialism was measured in the pre-negotiation survey to avoid any influence 
from intercultural negotiation on negotiators’ essentialism, and among other social belief filler 
scales to minimize the possibility of making cultural issues salient before negotiation. The 
essentialism scale has 4 items (adopted from Chao et al., 2007; No et al., 2008), including 
“although people can act differently in different situations, the core ethnocultural characteristics 
they hold cannot be changed much” (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) (α = .79). 
The higher the scores participants get, the stronger the essentialist beliefs they endorse, and the 
lower the scores they get, the stronger the non-essentialist beliefs they endorse. There is no 
significant difference in the endorsement of essentialist beliefs across the two cultural conditions, 
t(76) <1, ns.  
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Control Measures 
 To further examine whether cultural essentialism has unique predictive power of 
negotiation outcomes that is over and beyond other related constructs, control variables 
previously shown to be associated with negotiation outcomes, and potentially in intercultural 
ones, were measured in a post-negotiation survey for additional analyses. Cultural intelligence 
(Ang et al., 2007; α = .76) and multicultural experience (Narvaez & Hill, 2010; α = .70) were 
included as past research has shown that negotiators with higher cultural intelligence and rich 
multicultural experience can discover more integrative potential and achieve better negotiation 
outcomes in intercultural negotiation (Imai & Gelfand, 2010; Maddux et al., 2010). Cultural 
intelligence does not correlate (r = -.12, ns) and multicultural experience moderately correlates 
with essentialism in our sample (r = -.30, p = .01). Including the measures allows the analysis to 
test if the effect of cultural essentialism in intercultural negotiation depends on prior cultural 
knowledge and experience. Because conceptually cultural essentialism can induce a situated 
flexible mindset in the intercultural situation, which does not necessitate prior cultural 
knowledge and experience, I expect that adding the two measures in the model should not 
undermine the significance of cultural essentialism in predicting negotiation outcomes.  
 Moreover, implicit negotiation beliefs (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; α = .69), defined as 
entity beliefs that negotiator ability is not changeable, was also included. Stronger implicit 
negotiation beliefs were found associated with weaker learning orientation and worse negotiation 
outcomes. The implicit negotiation beliefs measure moderately correlate with essentialism (r 
= .38, p = .001). It was included in the study to demonstrate that the effect of cultural 
essentialism in intercultural negotiation is unique about the cultural context, which is not 
generalizable to general negotiation beliefs. Therefore, I expect that adding the implicit 
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negotiation belief measure in the model would not undermine the significance of the effect of 
cultural essentialism. 
Results 
 Descriptive information and bivariate correlations for the focal and control variables can 
be seen in Table 1. Gender and role were included all the analyses as covariates as suggested in 
past negotiation research to control for their general effects on negotiation outcomes (Curhan, 
Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Gunia et al., 2011; 
Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002; Liu et al., 2012). 
Individual Gains 
 Given the negotiation task involves two parties and the outcome an actor gets is 
interdependent to the partner within the dyad, and vice versa, analyzing the results on the 
individual level without taking into account of the interdependence can lead to bias in 
significance testing (Bliese & Hanges, 2004; Cook & Kenny, 2005; Kenny, 1996); whereas 
aggregating the scores of the two parties in each dyad would neglect the relational nature of a 
dyadic interaction (Campbell & Kashy, 2002; Kenny & Cook, 1999; Kenny, 1996)2. Therefore, 
to test effects on individual gains, I employed the actor partner interdependence model (APIM; 
Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). The model retains the variance in the 
individual level measures but at the same time accounts for nesting of the negotiation actor and 
partner within dyads. In other words, the model simultaneous estimates both the effect of the 
negotiator’ essentialist beliefs on individual gain (actor effect) and the effect of the negotiation 
partner’s essentialist beliefs on the negotiator’s individual gain (partner effect) within a dyad; 
                                                             
2 I include the dyadic level analysis of joint gains in the next section as a supplementary analysis. 
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therefore, the APIM model can control for and explain the mutual influence of the actor and 
partner’s outcomes within the dyad and provide fractional degrees of freedom depending on the 
extent of non-independence observed (see Figure 2). The dataset was structured in a pairwise 
fashion, where there was one record for each participant, but there were also scores of the 
participant’s partner in each record (see Kenny et al., 2006). Specifically, the actor and partner 
effects on the dependent variables (i.e. individual gains of actor and partner) were estimated 
using APIM with linear mixed-effects modeling on SPSS (Kenny et al., 2006). The Cultural 
Condition variable varied between dyads and was effect-coded (Intracultural condition = -1 and 
Intercultural condition = +1) in APIM as a between-dyad moderator (Kenny et al., 2006; 
Krasikova & LeBreton, 2012). The effects of gender and role are also controlled in the model.  
 Analyses for individual gains are summarized in the model in Table 2. The intraclass 
correlation (ICC) of essentialism is -.20 (p > .10), which implies that essentialism of actor and 
partner in negotiation dyads are not related to each other, demonstrating that random assignment 
to dyad was successful. The ICC of individual gains was  -.82 (p < .001), which suggests that 
there was a significant amount of between-dyad variance but there was also within-dyad variance 
that justified the use of dyadic analyses (Kenny et al., 2006). Pseudo R2 was calculated 
representing the proportion of variance explained in the model from the overall variance in 
negotiation gains (Kenny et al., 2006). The model accounts for 16% of the variance in individual 
negotiation gains (pseudo R2 = .16).  
 Hypothesis 1 proposed an interaction of essentialism and cultural condition whereby non-
essentialist beliefs would be positively associated with individual gains in intercultural (vs. 
intracultural) negotiation. As predicted, a significant interaction between Cultural Condition X 
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Actor Essentialism emerged, β  = -.23, t(50.74) = -2.20, p = .033, 95% CI [.031, .70]3. However, 
the Cultural Condition X Partner Essentialism and the Cultural Condition X Actor Essentialism 
X Partner Essentialism interactions were not significant, t(50.78) = 1.14, ns, and t(32.02) < 1, 
respectively. These results suggest that an actor’s essentialist beliefs influenced his/her own 
negotiation outcomes differently in intercultural and intracultural negotiation contexts. But the 
partner’s essentialist beliefs did not independently influence the negotiation outcomes of the 
actor across the two cultural conditions.  
 Follow-up analyses were conducted to investigate the significant Cultural Condition X 
Actor Essentialism interaction (see Figure 2). In intercultural negotiation, the more the actor 
endorsed essentialist beliefs, the lower the individual gains the actor attained, β = -.29, t(35.90) = 
-3.29, p = .002, 95% CI [-.47, -.11]. And as expected, an actor effect was not significant in 
intracultural negotiation, β = .09, t(18.02) < 1. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted two simple actor effects, that actors endorsing essentialist beliefs 
attained lower individual gains in intercultural than intracultural negotiations (H2a), whereas the 
reverse occurs for actors endorsing non-essentialist beliefs (H2b). The simple effects were tested 
at one standard deviation above and below the mean of essentialism. The results support both 
hypotheses. Among essentialists (+1 SD), there was also a significant simple main effect of 
Cultural Condition, β = -.56, t(60.06)= -2.05, p = .045, in which they achieved significantly 
lower individual gains in intercultural negotiation (M = 15.5 million, SD = 1.00 million), than in 
intracultural negotiation (M = 2.28 million, SD = 1.00 million). Among non-essentialists (-1 SD), 
there was a simple main effect of Cultural Condition, β = -2.18, t(52.06) = -2.18, p = .034, in 
                                                             
3 The interaction remained significant after controlling for cultural intelligence (Ang et al., 2007), multicultural 
experience (Narvaez & Hill, 2010), and implicit negotiation beliefs (Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). 
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which they attained significantly higher individual gains in intercultural negotiation (M = 2.81 
million, SD = 1.00 million), than in intracultural negotiation (M = 2.08 million, SD = 1.00 
million). 
Supplementary Analysis: Joint Gains 
 APIM results have indicated that the partner’s essentialism does not have significant 
additional influence on the actor’s own individual gains, but it is theoretically interesting to also 
look at whether dyad average of essentialism would influence joint gains in negotiation (i.e. dyad 
sum of individual negotiation gains), which is often conceptualized as the indicator of 
cooperative and creative negotiation in past negotiation literature (see De Dreu, Weingart, & 
Kwon, 2000; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). To examine joint gains, I analyzed the data at the dyad 
level using hierarchical regression and individual scores within dyads were aggregated to dyad 
scores (e.g. Curhan & Pentland, 2007). Dyadic joint gains were regressed on Gender (-1 = 
Female; +1 = Male), Cultural Condition (-1 = Intracultural; +1 = Intercultural), and dyadic 
average of Essentialism. Gender was entered in model 1, and Cultural Condition and 
Essentialism were entered in model 2. Both models were not statistically significant, p > .10. 
Cultural Condition X Essentialism interaction was entered in model 3, and it was marginally 
significant, β = -.50, t(32) = -1.96, p = .0594. The addition of the interaction term contributed a 
marginally significant increment of 10% variance (∆R2 = .10, F(1, 32) = 3.84, p = .059). 
Unpacking the interaction, I found that there were trends for the simple slope of essentialism in 
both conditions. In intracultural negotiation, the higher the essentialist beliefs the dyad endorsed, 
the higher joint gains the dyad attained, β = .34, t(32) = 1.32, p = .16. In intercultural negotiation, 
                                                             
4 The effects of the control variables on joint gains were not tested as a complementary analysis due to limited 
statistical power with a small sample size. 
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the lower essentialist beliefs the dyad endorsed, the higher joint gains the dyad attained, β = -.40, 
t(32) = -1.74, p = .12. Simple slope analyses revealed that among non-essentialists (-1 SD), the 
simple effect of Cultural Condition was marginally significant, β = .80, t(32) = 1.95, p = .06, 
such that non-essentialist dyads attained higher joint gains in intercultural negotiation (M = 4.65 
million, SD = .61 million), compared with intracultural negotiation (M = 4.04 million, SD = .61 
million). But the simple effect of Cultural Condition was not significant among essentialist dyads 
(+1 SD), β = -.31, t < 1, which means there is no difference in joint gains across cultural 
conditions for essentialist dyads. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Discussion 
Results support the hypotheses that a negotiator’s cultural essentialist beliefs interacted 
with the cultural context, and affected intercultural but not intracultural negotiation outcomes. As 
predicted, relative to intracultural negotiators, intercultural negotiators who endorsed essentialist 
beliefs suffered worse negotiation outcomes, showing a cultural collision effect; on the contrary, 
intercultural negotiators who endorsed non-essentialist beliefs attained even better negotiation 
outcomes, showing a cultural synergy effect. 
The current study is a pioneer in testing cultural synergy, as opposed to merely 
difficulties, in intercultural negotiation. Although past negotiation scholars have long 
hypothesized that there might be possibility for cultures to synergize in intercultural negotiations 
(e.g., Adler, 1991; Weiss, 1994a, 1994b), there is barely any empirical evidence showing how it 
could happen to the best of my knowledge. With a culturally diverse work sample, the current 
study addressed this pressing question in the field and demonstrated that some negotiators can 
indeed benefit from the intercultural setting and achieve remarkable outcomes. Specifically, in 
the current sample, non-essentialist dyads on average attained 4.65 million, which is equivalent 
to 92% of the Pareto Optimal, defined as the best outcome possible (i.e. the maximum joint gains 
of 5.08 million in the current simulation).  This is a remarkable performance relative to the 
average of 83% for intracultural dyads in the current study; and relative to past studies using the 
same simulation, among both inter- and intracultural negotiations, for example, 68% for U.S.-
Japanese dyads (Brett & Okumura, 1998), 60 – 70% for U.S.-Chinese dyads with high quality of 
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communication (Liu et al., 2010), 83% for U.S.-U.S. dyads (Gunia et al., 2011) and 84% for 
Japanese-Japanese dyads (Brett & Okumura, 1998). 
Above and beyond identifying intercultural difficulties, the results enrich the limited 
intercultural negotiation and intergroup literature by extending our understanding of how 
individual factors of negotiators can affect intercultural negotiation outcomes. This study sheds 
light on why cultural collision and synergy can both occur in an intercultural setting and the 
results suggest that it depends on the individual’s level of cultural essentialist beliefs. In line with 
early theoretical speculations (Adler, 1991; Weiss, 1994a, 1994b), cultural synergy is indeed 
possible in intercultural negotiation, and I have identified that non-essentialism is a crucial factor. 
The findings reveal that non-essentialism can increase both individual gain of the negotiator and 
joint gain for the negotiation dyad. As joint gains are increased when negotiators can flexibly 
integrate issues and find a creative solution (Maddux et al., 2010), the results suggest that seeing 
cultural differences as more malleable allow negotiators to think more flexibly and discover 
more integrative potential in intercultural negotiation, relative to intracultural negotiation, 
leading to a cultural synergistic effect.  
In order to strengthen the robustness of hypothesis testing on essentialism, I excluded 
alternative explanations by controlling for other individual factors that might influence 
intercultural negotiation effectiveness. The results show that non-essentialism has a unique and 
robust positive influence over intercultural negotiation outcomes beyond other individual factors, 
namely high cultural intelligence, high multicultural experience and low implicit negotiation 
beliefs. This means that regardless of the negotiator’s prior knowledge of other cultures and 
foreign cultural experience, and other implicit beliefs about negotiation, subtle as cultural 
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essentialist beliefs negotiators implicitly bring to the bargaining table can determine tangible 
monetary outcomes in intercultural negotiation. 
Practically, the results offer suggestions for cultural training in how to harvest cultural 
synergy in intercultural business contexts. Essentialist beliefs are usually measured as an 
individual difference variable, but they are also susceptible to change by situational manipulation 
and training (e.g., Chao et al., 2007; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; No et al., 2008). Cultural training 
programs are popular in organizations not only because there is a need to equip sojourners for 
working aboard, but also for the increasingly diverse workplace locally. While such training is 
designed to enhance one’s cultural intelligence and promote intercultural effectiveness, some 
recent evidence has suggested that the content of cultural training sometimes does more harms 
than good as they could unintentionally enhance trainees’ cultural essentialist beliefs (Fischer, 
2011). My research findings suggest cultural trainers should be more mindful of whether the 
training might induce or reduce cultural essentialist beliefs. To avoid inducing essentialist beliefs 
in cultural training programs,  trainers might need to avoid deterministic language in talking 
about cultural differences, emphasize within-culture variation, and explain why, in an 
intercultural setting people might not behave in their culturally normative way (see Adair et al., 
2009; Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Kashima et al., 2010).    
Limitations and Future Opportunities 
 As much as I tried to model real-life negotiation, the study was conducted as an in-class 
negotiation exercise with unique demographics and pre-negotiation experience. First, all 
participants are highly educated and might be more skillful in negotiating than uneducated 
samples (Fulmer & Barry, 2004; Kurtzberg, 1998), so further research is needed to generalize the 
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findings to other populations. However, it is also worth noting that the educated manager sample 
in the study also brings an advantage for external validity because it is representative to the 
particular population that is frequently involved in business negotiation. In addition, although the 
negotiation exercise was conducted very early in the course (during the fourth class), some 
negotiators might already have acquainted with their negotiation partners, and knowing whom 
they are negotiating with in advance might deter negotiators with high prejudice to have negative 
expectancies of the interaction and avoid the negotiation (see Plant & Devine, 2003). But with a 
random assignment of cultural conditions and the presence rate of participants at 98% (with only 
two absentees), there seems not to be a strong self-selection problem. More importantly, these 
concerns should not undermine the significance of the interaction, and rather, provide a more 
conservative test of the moderation hypothesis. But they have inspired future research questions 
related to how pre-negotiation dynamics might influence the negotiation outcome. 
 The current design did not measure what happened during the negotiation process and 
therefore did not allow deeper understanding of the mechanism through which essentialism 
impacts negotiation outcomes. Essentialists and non-essentialists may enact very different 
communication and negotiation strategies, which lead to the divergent negotiation outcomes. For 
example, a good understanding of the partner’s preferences is associated with higher negotiation 
gains. Because essentialists have a more fixed mindset, they employ more substantiation and 
offers in intercultural negotiation (S&O strategy), leading to poorer understanding of the 
partner’s preferences and low gains. On the other hand, non-essentialists, having a more flexible 
mindset, might be willing to ask more questions and provide more answers in intercultural 
negotiation (Q&A strategy), leading to better understanding of the partner’s preferences and 
higher gains (see Gunia et al., 2011). 
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 As reviewed earlier, prior research suggests that theoretically essentialism influences 
intergroup outcomes through two main pathways. First, essentialist beliefs enhance animosity 
and prejudice toward outgroups, leading to rejection attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Halperin et al., 
2011; Jayaratne et al., 2006; Kung et al., 2012). This mechanism of negative intergroup attitudes 
is in line with my findings that essentialist negotiators indeed achieved worse outcomes in 
intercultural than intracultural negotiations. However, this mechanism might or might not 
explain why non-essentialists performed better than intracultural negotiators. One emerging 
question to address is whether non-essentialists have a more positive attitude toward outgroups 
than ingroups (i.e. outgroup positive bias), and why? There is limited past empirical evidence to 
support this claim, but some recent research seem to suggest that non-essentialists may extend 
trust to outgroups more than ingroups (see Chao, Yao, & Fu, 2014; Saguy & Halperin, 2014).  
 The second mechanism through which essentialism influences intergroup outcomes is 
moderating one’s cognitive flexibility. Non-essentialists are more integrative in thinking and 
more creative than essentialists (e.g. Tadmor et al., 2013). Therefore, essentialists suffer from 
more close-mindedness while non-essentialists enjoy higher creativity in an intercultural setting.  
My results support this cognitive flexibility expansion claim.  APIM results show that non-
essentialist negotiators are able to create larger joint gains in intercultural negotiation without 
sacrificing their individual gains or reducing the partner’s individual gains; on the contrary, they 
in fact achieved better individual gain for themselves without hurting the interests of the partner. 
Therefore, non-essentialist negotiators are not merely taking advantage of the partner nor 
sacrificing themselves for the partner. Future research should experimentally manipulate 
essentialist beliefs (e.g. No et al., 2008) and measure negotiators’ intergroup attitudes and 
cognitive flexibility in negotiation to explore the mediating mechanism. Furthermore, more 
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research is desirable to address the overarching theoretical question of whether essentialism can 
influence certain intergroup conflict outcomes via attitudes, cognitive flexibility, or both 
simultaneously (see Chao & Kung, 2014). 
 In contrast to most past studies showing that intercultural negotiators often attained worse 
negotiation outcomes than intracultural negotiators, the cultural condition main effect was not 
significant in my study. But it should also be noted that, such a difference should not undermine 
our interpretation of the interaction effect. Moreover, I carefully compared the differences in 
demographics of the samples in the two cultural conditions. The pattern of the results remained 
significant even after controlling for potential confounds (e.g., multicultural experience and 
openness to experience). Nevertheless, replications of the study are desirable to ensure the 
effects obtained were not due to our specific sample and measures.  
Conclusion 
 Intercultural negotiations are both challenging and prevalent. The current study 
investigates how to improve intercultural negotiation outcomes, and has demonstrated that when 
intercultural negotiators have non-essentialist beliefs, they can achieve significantly better 
outcomes than intracultural negotiators. Our findings pave the way for future research to 
examine additional factors that help negotiators harvest cultural synergy for more favorable 
negotiation outcomes. 
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Appendix A 
Cartoon Negotiation Simulation Task (Buyer Role) (Dispute Resolution Research Center, 2008) 
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Appendix B 
Cartoon Negotiation Simulation Task (Seller Role) (Dispute Resolution Research Center, 2008) 
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Appendix C 
Cartoon Negotiation Simulation Payoff Summary (Dispute Resolution Research Center, 2008) 
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Figure 1. Actor-Partner Interdependence Model of the Effects of Essentialism on Individual 
Gains. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations for Focal Variables. 
         Correlations     
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
1. Cultural Condition   -   - --- .01 .00 -.10 -.22 .027 -.07 -.00  
2. Gender   -   - .01 --- -.03 -.05 -.13 -.05 .06 .13  
3. Role   -   - .00 .03 --- -.06 -.04 .13 -.03 .29**  
4. Cultural Intelligence 3.70 .52 -.10 -.16 .06 -.09 .01 -.14 .09 -.00  
5. Multicultural Experience 3.75 .54 -.22 -.26* .04 .48**      -.12 -.16 .01 .04  
6. Implicit Negotiation Beliefs 3.85 .66 .03 -.06 -.13 .05 .27* -.33* .15 -.20  
7. Essentialism 2.78 1.24 -.07 .20 .03 -.30* -.30* -.38** -.21 .20  
8. Individual Gains 2167506.41 996838.42 .00 .06 -.29** -.01 -.10 .27* -.16 -.81***  
9. Joint Gains 4335012.82 651925.16 -.01 .28* .00 -.02 -.09 .09 .07 .33**  
 
Note. Cultural condition (-1 = intracultural; +1 = intercultural), gender (-1 = female; +1 = male), and role (-1 = buyer; +1 = seller) are 
effect-coded. Intrapersonal correlations (e.g., actor’s essentialism and actor’s individual gains) are listed below the diagonal; 
interpersonal correlations (e.g., actor’s essentialism and partner’s individual gains) are listed above the diagonal; pairwise correlations 
(e.g. actor’s essentialism and partner’s essentialism) are listed on the diagonal.  
N = 78, and N = 39 for pairwise correlations. *p < .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p <.001.
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Table 2 
Mixed-Effect Linear Modeling Coefficients for the Actor Effect and Partner Effect of 
Essentialism, and the Moderation of Cultural Condition on Individual Negotiation Gains. 
Parameter Estimate SE β df 
Intercept 2,124.64** 56.04 -.04 32.13 
Gender 157.10* 62.19 .15* 32.94 
Role -356.92* 143.80 -.36* 36.00 
Cultural Condition 0.65 52.52 .00 32.02 
Essentialism_A -85.55 80.27 -.10 52.07 
Essentialism_P 126.97 79.92 .16 51.46 
Cultural Condition X Essentialism_A -181.43* 82.65 -.23* 50.74 
Cultural Condition X Essentialism_P  94.56 82.68 .12 50.78 
Essentialism_A X Essentialism_P  63.57 36.01 .10 32.11 
Cultural Condition X Essentialism_A X 
Essentialism_P 
-2.64 34.28 .00 32.02 
 Note. Essentialism_A = actor essentialism; Essentialism_P = partner essentialism. Pseudo R2 
= .16. Estimates and standard errors are reported in thousands. 
 
N = 78. *p < .05, **p ≤ .01  
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Figure 2. Levels of individual negotiation gains based on actors’ essentialism across intra- and 
intercultural negotiation. 
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